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Abstract 
Hypothesizing after the results are known, or HARKing, occurs when researchers check their 
research results and then add or remove hypotheses on the basis of those results without 
acknowledging this process in their research report (Kerr, 1998).  In the present article, I discuss 
three forms of HARKing: (1) using current results to construct post hoc hypotheses that are then 
reported as if they were a priori hypotheses; (2) retrieving hypotheses from a post hoc literature 
search and reporting them as a priori hypotheses; and (3) failing to report a priori hypotheses that are 
unsupported by the current results.  These three types of HARKing are often characterized as being 
bad for science and a potential cause of the current replication crisis.  In the present article, I use 
insights from the philosophy of science to present a more nuanced view.  Specifically, I identify the 
conditions under which each of these three types of HARKing is most and least likely to be bad for 
science.  I conclude with a brief discussion about the ethics of each type of HARKing. 
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In his seminal article on the subject, Kerr (1998) described the research practice of hypothesizing 
after the results are known or HARKing.  HARKing occurs when researchers check their research results 
and then add and/or remove hypotheses from their research report on the basis of those results.  This process 
can be disclosed or undisclosed to the readers of research reports (Hollenbeck & Wright, 2017; Schwab & 
Starbuck, 2017).  Following Kerr (1998), the present article is mainly concerned with undisclosed 
HARKing. 
Kerr (1998) distinguished between several different types of HARKing, and these can be grouped 
into two broad categories.  In the first category, researchers include one or more post hoc hypotheses in 
their research report as if they were a priori hypotheses.  In the second category, researchers exclude one or 
more a priori hypotheses from their research report.  Due to implicit pressures from the wider research 
community (Fanelli, 2010; Motyl et al., 2017; Nosek, Ebersole, DeHaven, & Mellor, 2017; O’Boyle, Banks, 
When Does HARKing Hurt?           2 
& Gonzalez-Mulé, 2017), researchers usually include post hoc hypotheses that are confirmed by their 
research results and exclude a priori hypotheses that are disconfirmed by their results.  Hence, from the 
readers’ perspective, a larger proportion of the researchers’ “a priori” hypotheses are supported than is 
actually the case. 
To illustrate these two categories of HARKing, consider a researcher who aims to test an a priori 
hypothesis – Hypothesis A – that expressions of prejudice increase self-esteem.  To test this hypothesis, the 
researcher randomly assigns a sample of participants to either describe their negative feelings about 
immigrants or to describe their positive feelings about immigrants.  The researcher then measures 
participants’ state self-esteem.  Contrary to Hypothesis A, she finds that participants in the negative feelings 
condition have significantly lower self-esteem than those in the positive feelings condition.  In an effort to 
accommodate this unexpected finding, the researcher engages in the two categories of HARKing.  First, 
she constructs a new post hoc hypothesis – Hypothesis B – that predicts the unexpected result.  Specifically, 
Hypothesis B predicts that expressions of prejudice reduce self-esteem.  The researcher then includes this 
post hoc hypothesis in her research report as if it was an a priori hypothesis.  Second, she removes any 
mention of Hypothesis A from her research report.  Crucially, she does not reveal any of these post hoc 
changes in her research report.  Hence, from the readers’ perspective, the researcher predicted and found 
that the prejudice reduces self-esteem. 
Kerr (1998) considered how cases such as the one above may be detrimental to scientific progress.  
He also differentiated between different types of HARKing and argued that they are unlikely to be 
equivalent in terms of their potential costs to scientific progress.  However, neither he nor subsequent 
discussants have explored this issue any further (Hollenbeck & Wright, 2017; Kerr, 1998; Leung, 2011; 
Schwab & Starbuck, 2017).  In particular, it remains unclear when different types of HARKing will be most 
likely and least likely to harm science.  It is important to address this issue in order to better understand the 
relationship between HARKing and the replication crisis.  In particular, under what conditions do different 
types of HARKing contribute to the publication of spurious effects that may represent Type I errors? 
The current article addresses this question in order to provide a more articulated and sophisticated 
understanding of HARKing’s threat to scientific progress and add some nuance to the common view that 
“all HARKing is bad.”  I begin by considering the assumptions that underpin this common view, focusing 
in particular on HARKing’s preclusion of falsification and its presumed implication in science’s replication 
crisis via the promulgation of false positive results. 
 
How HARKing Harms Science 
HARKing is considered to be problematic for scientific progress because it results in hypotheses 
that are always confirmed and never falsified by the results.  Falsification is an essential part of the scientific 
process because it allows researchers to distinguish hypotheses that are confirmed (i.e., clearly supported 
by the evidence) from those that are disconfirmed (Ferguson & Heene, 2012; Kerr, 1998; Leung, 2011).  
However, as illustrated in the example of the prejudice research study, HARKing can preclude reports of 
falsification by (a) generating post hoc hypotheses that always confirm the observed results and (b) 
suppressing a priori hypotheses that have been disconfirmed by those results.  Hence, HARKing can harm 
science by preventing the research community from accurately assessing which hypotheses are true and 
which are false. 
To illustrate HARKing’s preclusion of falsification, it is useful to consider the Texas sharpshooter 
analogy that is often used to describe this problem (e.g., De Groot, 2014; Wagenmakers, Wetzels, 
Borsboom, Kievit, & van der Maas, 2015).  In this analogy, a Texas sharpshooter aims and fires his gun at 
target on a barn wall but misses.  He then walks up to the wall, rubs out the initial target, and draws a second 
target around his bullet hole in order to make it appear as if he is a good shot.  In this analogy, the 
sharpshooter represents a researcher, the bullet hole is his evidence, the first target is an excluded a priori 
hypothesis, and the second target is an included post hoc hypothesis.  The analogy illustrates the 
impossibility of reported falsification when HARKing takes place:  It does not matter where the 
sharpshooter’s shot hits the barn wall; he will always make it look as if he has hit his target. 
When Does HARKing Hurt?           3 
HARKing’s preclusion of falsification would not be particularly problematic for scientific progress 
if HARKing was practiced by only a few researchers.  However, this is not the case.  As shown in Table 1, 
recent surveys have found that self-admission rates for HARKing are quite high, with close to half of 
researchers (43%) having HARKed at least once. 
 
Table 1 
Self-Admission Rates of HARKing in Self-Report Surveys 
Survey Population Survey Item N 
Self-Admission 
Rate 
John, Loewenstein, 
and Prelec (2012) 
 
USA psychologists “In a paper, reporting an unexpected 
finding as having been predicted from 
the start.” 
2,155 27.0% 
Agnoli, Wicherts, 
Veldkamp, Albiero, 
and Cubelli (2017) 
 
Italian 
psychologists 
“In a paper, reporting an unexpected 
finding as having been predicted from 
the start.” 
277 37.4% 
Bosco, Aguinis, 
Field, Pierce, and 
Dalton (2016, Study 
1) 
Researchers who 
published in 
Personnel 
Psychology and the 
Journal of Applied 
Psychology during 
2005 to 2010 
 
“whether any changes in hypotheses 
had occurred between the completion of 
data collection and subsequent 
publication.” 
53 38% 
Fiedler and 
Schwarz (2016) 
 
German 
psychologists 
“Reporting an unexpected finding as 
having been predicted from the start.” 
1,138 47% 
Banks et al. (2016, 
Studies 1 & 2) 
Management 
researchers 
“selectively reported hypotheses on the 
basis of statistical significance…and 
presented a post hoc hypothesis as if it 
were developed a priori.” 
 
749 50% 
Motyl et al. (2017, 
Study 1) 
Personality and 
social psychologists 
from Australian, 
European, and the 
USA 
“Report that unexpected findings were 
expected.” 
1,166 58% 
   Mean 43% 
Note. Self-admission rates are for undertaking the stated behavior “at least once.” Self-admission rates are likely to be 
underestimates because researchers tend to underreport practices that they perceive to be undesirable (Agnoli et al., 
2017). 
 
Why do researchers HARK?  The evidence seems to suggest that they do so in order to increase 
their chances of publishing their work in a system that places a high value on the hypothetico-deductive 
approach to science (Fanelli, 2010; Kerr, 1998; Mazzola & Deuling, 2013; Motyl et al., 2017; O’Boyle et 
al., 2017).  For example, Mazzola and Deuling (2013) analyzed 215 published journal articles and 127 
unpublished PhD dissertations that were produced in the area of industrial-organizational psychology 
during 2010-2012.  They found that, compared with the unpublished dissertations, the published journal 
articles contained a significantly higher percentage of supported hypotheses and a significantly lower 
percentage of unsupported hypotheses.  This evidence suggests that researchers HARKed when writing 
their journal articles by including confirmed post hoc hypotheses and excluding disconfirmed a priori 
hypotheses, and that these actions facilitated the publication of their articles (for similar results, see O’Boyle 
et al., 2017). 
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Despite (or perhaps because of) its relatively widespread occurrence, the research community does 
not appear to have been particularly concerned about HARKing.  Indeed, Kerr’s (1998) seminal article on 
HARKing was discussed in a collection of the most “underappreciated” and “unloved” work by social 
psychologists (Kerr, 2011).  Commenting on his 1998 article, Kerr (2011) lamented that, “if there has been 
lively discussion and debate on this issue [HARKing] in (or outside of) social psychology since the paper’s 
appearance, it has escaped my notice” (p. 129).  However, things have changed markedly since 2011, and 
the issue of HARKing has now become a hot topic.  This increased interested is illustrated in Figure 1, 
which shows the relative frequency of citations to Kerr’s (1998) article over the 20 year period from 1997 
to 2016.  In order to control for potential changes in citation rates over this period, Figure 1 shows the 
differences between the number of citations to Kerr’s (1998) article and the average number of citations to 
two other articles that were published in the same issue of the same journal (Glaser & Salovey, 1998; 
Helgeson & Fritz, 1998).  As can be seen in Figure 1, Kerr’s article had a similar number of citations to the 
other two articles until 2011 when the number of citations to Kerr’s article increased substantially from 
year to year.  In fact, Kerr’s article received more citations in 2016 (n = 88) than it did in the previous 15 
year period from 1997 to 2011 (n = 82). 
 
 
Figure 1. Difference in number citations per year to Kerr’s (1998) seminal article on HARKing compared to the 
average number of citations to two other articles that were published in the same issue of the same journal.  The 
difference in citations remained relatively low during the period 1997-2010 and then increased dramatically after 
2011.  Data is sourced from Google Scholar. 
 
The dramatic rise in citations to Kerr’s (1998) article after 2011 may be attributed to the research 
community’s increased concern about research practices in general.  This concern was triggered by a 
number of key events during 2011.  In that year, social psychologist Diederik Stapel was suspended from 
his university on the grounds of fabricating scientific data.  (To date, 55 articles have been implicated.)  In 
the same year, social psychologist Daryl Bem (an advocate of certain types of HARKing; Bem, 1987) 
published questionable work that purported to provide evidence of precognition and premonition (Bem, 
2011).  Finally, 2011 also saw the publication of an influential paper that demonstrated how researchers 
can use undisclosed flexibility in their data analyses to produce statistically significant results – an approach 
that has come to be known as p-hacking (Simmons, Nelson, & Simonsohn, 2011).  For these reasons, 2011 
is usually taken to mark the beginning of serious concerns about the validity of commonly-used research 
practices in psychology and science in general.  More recently, these concerns have intensified following 
an attempt to replicate the findings of 100 psychology studies (Open Science Collaboration, 2015) that 
found that replicated effect sizes were only half the size of original effect sizes, and that only “39% of 
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effects were subjectively rated to have replicated the original result” (Open Science Collaboration, 2015, 
p. 943).  The reasons for these replication results are the subject of much debate.  Certainly, it is difficult to 
draw strong conclusions about the replicability of an effect based on a single failed replication attempt (e.g., 
Maxwell, Lau, & Howard, 2015).  Nonetheless, several researchers have concluded that the use of 
questionable research practices (John et al., 2012) has caused a unexpectedly low rate of replication in 
psychology and other fields (e.g., Baker, 2016; Motyl et al., 2017; Munafò et al., 2017; Świątkowski & 
Dompnier, 2017). 
The increased number of citations to Kerr’s (1998) article after 2011 suggests that researchers 
perceive a connection between HARKing and the replication crisis.  Consistent with this view, a recent 
survey of over 1,500 researchers found that “selective reporting of results” was regarded as the most 
important factor contributing to irreproducible research (Baker, 2016).  In addition, several commentators 
have argued that HARKing is one of the questionable research practices that reduces the replicability of 
published effects (e.g., Aguinis, Cascio, & Ramani, 2017; Hollenbeck & Wright, 2017; John et al., 2012; 
Kerr, 1998; Mazzola & Deuling, 2013; Munafò et al., 2017; Schwab & Starbuck, 2017; Świątkowski & 
Dompnier, 2017; Unkelbach, 2016; Wagenmakers, Wetzels, Borsboom, & van der Maas, 2011).  According 
to this argument, although many researchers claim to conduct confirmatory tests of a priori hypotheses, 
they actually conduct multiple exploratory tests that are uncorrected for having a greater chance of detecting 
false positive results.  They also use researchers’ degrees of freedom (Simmons et al., 2011) to “massage” 
their data into yielding statistically significant results (i.e., p-hacking).  After checking the results of these 
exploratory tests, researchers then omit any disconfirmed a priori hypotheses and construct new post hoc 
hypotheses that have no potential to be falsified by their results.  Finally, they misrepresent their post hoc 
hypotheses as a priori hypotheses in order to give the impression of confirmatory tests.  As a consequence, 
the research literature reports many effects that are supposedly predicted by a priori hypotheses but that are 
actually unanticipated artefacts of multiple uncorrected exploratory tests and/or p-hacking.  These spurious 
effects are more likely to be limited to the specific samples in which they were discovered and, 
consequently, less likely to replicate in other samples. 
The above viewpoint has led to the conclusions that (a) HARKing is bad for science, and (b) greater 
openness and transparency is required in the research process.  Two complementary approaches have been 
put forward to address these issues. 
The first approach is for researchers to preregister their a priori hypotheses, materials, and analysis 
plans (e.g., Bosco et al., 2016; Lindsay, Simons, & Lilienfeld, 2016; Nosek et al., 2017; Richards, 2016).  
Preregistration does not prevent researchers from conducting unplanned statistical tests and/or putting 
forward new post hoc hypotheses.  However, it does ensure that these post hoc activities are undertaken 
openly and transparently, and this transparency allows readers to adjust their expectations regarding the 
potential replicability of associated results. 
The second approach is to change the culture of the scientific community so that it is more 
accepting of exploratory research (e.g., Hollenbeck & Wright, 2017; Schwab & Starbuck, 2017).  Such a 
change is intended to reduce researchers’ motivation to engage in undisclosed HARKing.  Hence, like 
preregistration, this cultural change is intended to replace undisclosed HARKing with transparent 
HARKing. 
Both preregistration and greater cultural acceptance of exploratory research represent important 
approaches towards preventing undisclosed HARKing.  However, both approaches are predicated on the 
assumption that undisclosed HARKing is bad for science, and it is here that I believe that a more nuanced 
view may be warranted.  HARKing represents an umbrella term for a collection of several different research 
practices, and each practice can have different implications for scientific progress under different 
conditions.  Consequently, the unqualified assumption that “HARKing is bad for science” is likely to be 
inaccurate.  Instead, it is more likely to be the case that only some types of HARKing are bad for science 
under some conditions.  In the present paper, I aim to unpack this more articulated view of HARKing in 
order to allow researchers to make more informed decisions about this questionable research practice. 
In the following sections, I leverage several concepts from the philosophy of science in order to 
identify the specific conditions under which different types of HARKing pose the greatest threat to scientific 
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progress.  I argue that treating post hoc hypotheses as if they are a priori hypotheses only has the potential 
to harm science when those hypotheses lack independence from the observed evidence, and even in this 
case the potential for harm is reduced when tests are rigorous and hypothesis construction follows certain 
key principles.  I also argue that failing to report a priori hypotheses is only harmful when those hypotheses 
are related to final research conclusions and/or the subject of rigorous tests. 
 
Lessons from the Philosophy of Science: Use Novelty and Test Severity 
Discussions of HARKing have tended to lag behind related discussions of hypothesis testing in the 
philosophy of science.  Discussions of HARKing often refer to Popperian falsification and the distinction 
between prediction and accommodation (e.g., Bosco et al., 2016; Hollenbeck & Wright, 2017; Kerr, 1998; 
Leung, 2011).  However, there has been not been any in-depth consideration of more modern insights about 
the extent to which evidence provides novel information in relation to hypotheses (Worrall, 1985, 2010, 
2014) or the extent to which severe tests of those hypotheses provide diagnostic information (Mayo, 1991, 
1996, 2008, 2010, 2014; Mayo & Spanos, 2006).  These philosophical insights are important because they 
provide a basis for determining when different types of HARKing are problematic for science and when 
they are not.  I introduce the concept of use novelty first and then consider test severity. 
 
Use Novelty 
Many philosophers of science believe that in order for evidence to confirm a hypothesis the 
evidence must be not only consistent with the hypothesis but also novel in some way (e.g., Mayo, 1996; 
Musgrave, 1974; Worrall, 1985; Zahar, 1973, based on Lakatos, 1970).  The general argument is that 
evidence that is not novel in relation to a hypothesis may be biased towards either confirming or 
disconfirming that hypothesis because it may have been used as the basis for constructing that hypothesis . 
According to the temporal conceptualization of novelty, evidence must be observed after a 
hypothesis has been constructed in order for it to represent novel evidence for that hypothesis.  From this 
perspective, evidence can only be novel for a priori hypotheses and not for post hoc hypotheses because a 
priori hypotheses are constructed prior to data collection whereas post hoc hypotheses are constructed after 
data collection.  Consequently, only a priori hypotheses have the potential to predict and be falsified by 
evidence (Musgrave, 1974; Worrall, 1985). 
However, several philosophers of science have pointed out that temporal novelty is really only a 
heuristic for distinguishing between hypotheses that are constructed independent from the current evidence 
and hypotheses that are constructed on the basis of the current evidence (e.g., Hitchcock & Sober, 2004; 
Mayo, 1991, 1996; Musgrave, 1974; Worrall, 1985, 2014; Zahar, 1973; see also Dienes, 2016; Kerr, 1998).  
Hence, a more accurate conceptualization of novelty refers to a hypothesis’ independence from the evidence 
rather than whether or not the hypothesis was constructed before the evidence was known.  There are several 
different conceptualizations of independence (Musgrave, 1974; Worrall, 1985; Zahar, 1973).  Here, I refer 
to Worrall’s (1985, 2010, 2014) concept of use novelty because it is the most clearly articulated approach 
(Mayo, 1991).  According to Worrall, evidence is only novel for a hypothesis if information about that 
evidence has not been “used” in the construction of the hypothesis. 
Importantly, the use novelty approach assumes that both a priori and post hoc hypotheses have the 
potential to predict and be falsified by previously-observed evidence (e.g., Worrall, 2014).  In particular, 
post hoc hypotheses can be falsified by previously-observed evidence as long as they are constructed 
independent from that evidence.  This independence ensures that the contents of the hypotheses are not 
biased towards being either confirmed or disconfirmed by the evidence.  Similar reasoning allows post hoc 
hypotheses to predict a researcher’s current results (Worrall, 1985, 2014).  If information from a set of 
evidence is not used in the construction of a hypothesis, then that evidence is use novel for the hypothesis, 
and the hypothesis may be used to predict that evidence even if the evidence was observed by the researcher 
prior to the construction of the hypothesis. 
To provide a practical illustration, imagine that our prejudice researcher conducted her study and 
obtained the opposite result to that predicted by her original a priori Hypothesis A.  In other words, she 
found that the prejudice reduced, rather than increased, self-esteem.  Lacking any theoretical explanation 
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for this result, the researcher does not try to publish it.  Instead, she files it away.  Two years later, she reads 
a newly-published paper in which an independent group of researchers has put forward a different 
hypothesis – Hypothesis B – that prejudice reduces self-esteem.  From a temporal novelty perspective, 
Hypothesis B represents a post hoc hypothesis because it was constructed after our researcher observed her 
evidence.  Nonetheless, it was constructed independent from this evidence by an independent group of 
researchers.  Consequently, from a use novelty perspective, the researcher’s evidence provides an 
informative test of Hypothesis B.  Note that, in this particular scenario, the researcher’s evidence supports 
Hypothesis B.  However, this confirmation does not alter the fact the test procedure is unbiased and has the 
potential to produce disconfirmations.  This point can be demonstrated if we imagine that the prejudice 
researcher read about two independent hypotheses after observing her results.  The first hypothesis – 
Hypothesis B – predicts that prejudice reduces self-esteem, whereas the second hypothesis – Hypothesis C 
– predicts that prejudice has no effect on self-esteem.  Although our researcher’s observed evidence 
confirms Hypothesis B, it disconfirms Hypothesis C.  Hence, the post hoc nature of a hypothesis does not 
necessarily make it unfalsifiable. 
Most researchers tend to employ temporal novelty rather than use novelty when judging hypothesis 
tests.  However, temporal novelty is a rather blunt and sometimes inaccurate criterion with which to gauge 
the independence between a hypothesis and its associated evidence.  Certainly, temporal novelty is 
sufficient to demonstrate independence because it is impossible to construct a hypothesis on the basis of 
evidence that has yet to be known.  However, temporal novelty is not always necessary to demonstrate 
independence because it is possible to construct an independent hypothesis after knowing the evidence that 
is to be tested by that hypothesis (Mayo, 1991; Worrall, 1985; Zahar, 1973).  Consequently, use novelty is 
more accurate than temporal novelty because it does not incorrectly imply that all post hoc hypotheses lack 
independence from the known results. 
A few previous discussions of HARKing have made indirect reference to the concept of use novelty 
and its associated prohibition against the double use of evidence in constructing and testing the same 
hypothesis.  For example, Kerr (1998, p. 206) argued that “it is asking too much of one set of data both to 
suggest a new hypothesis to an investigator and simultaneously to provide an ‘independent’ empirical 
confirmation of that hypothesis.” More recently, Wagenmakers Wetzels, Borsboom, van der Maas, and 
Kievit (2012, p. 633) made a similar point with regards to exploratory research: “a hypothesis that is 
developed on the basis of exploration of a data set is unlikely to be refuted by that same data.”  But these 
brief nods towards use novelty do not highlight the alternative possibility:  Post hoc hypotheses that are 
developed independently from the current results do have the potential to predict and be falsified by those 
results.  Kerr (1998, p. 199) came closest to acknowledging this possibility when he asked “is it HARKing 
if one advances a new and useful theory that comes to one's attention independently of but after one's 
knowledge of the results?”  He did not provide a definite answer to this question but instead noted that some 
types of HARKing fall into a “grey region.”  In the present article, I argue that this “grey region” is larger 
than might be assumed, and that concepts from the philosophy of science can help to clarify the contents of 
this region and their implications for scientific progress.  In particular, based on the distinction between 
temporal novelty and use novelty, I draw a parallel distinction between hypothesizing after the results are 
known and hypothesizing on the basis of the known results.  I argue that in cases in which researchers 
hypothesize on the basis of the known results, evidence is not use novel and prediction and falsification are 
not possible.  In contrast, in cases in which researchers hypothesize after the results are known but not on 
the basis of those results, use novelty is preserved, prediction and falsification are possible, and there is no 
detriment to scientific progress.  However, before considering these issues in greater depth, it is necessary 
to briefly introduce a second philosophical concept that has been brought to bear on the issue of hypothesis 
testing, and that is test severity. 
 
Test Severity 
Worrall’s (1985, 2010, 2014) concept of use novelty is restricted to the relation between hypotheses 
and evidence.  However, there are actually three key aspects of any hypothesis test: the hypothesis, the 
evidence, and the test of the hypothesis.  Based on Popper (1979), Mayo (1991, 1996, 2008, 2014; Mayo 
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& Spanos, 2006) argued that it is important to consider the rigor of the test of the hypothesis, or test severity, 
when reaching conclusions about the confirmation or disconfirmation of hypotheses.  According to Mayo, 
a test is severe if it has a low probability of confirming a hypothesis that is false.  Test severity relates to 
the statistical and methodological reliability and validity of hypothesis tests.1  Hence, severe tests are those 
that use reliable, sensitive measures, high statistical power, and stringent Type I error control (Mayo, 1991; 
Parker, 2015).  Severe tests also avoid p-hacking and refer to sensitivity analyses in order to check the 
robustness of results to different assumptions and procedures (Mayo, 1991).  In addition, severe tests use 
research designs and methods that have a high degree of internal, external, and construct validity (Mayo, 
1996).  Finally, severe tests employ both direct and conceptual replications within and across studies in 
order to reduce the probability of incorrect confirming a false hypothesis. 
Severe tests are necessary for meaningful confirmation and falsification (Parker, 2015).  A 
nonsevere test provides unreliable and/or invalid test results that cannot be taken to provide stringent 
evidence either for or against a hypothesis.  In particular, confirmation based on a nonsevere test may 
represent a false positive error:  The confirmed hypothesis may actually be false.  Similarly, falsification 
based on a nonsevere test may represent a false negative error:  The falsified hypothesis may actually be 
true.  Returning to our Texas sharpshooter analogy, if it is a rainy, windy day and the sharpshooters’ rifle 
sights are not correctly adjusted, then the test of his marksmanship is nonsevere, and we cannot draw any 
strong conclusions based on any of the targets that he hits or misses. 
 
Summary 
In summary, use novelty refers to the independence between a hypothesis’ construction and the 
observed evidence, and test severity refers to the reliability and validity of tests of the hypothesis.  Put 
another way, use novelty refers to the way in which the hypothesis is produced, whereas test severity refers 
to the way in which the evidence is produced.  Both use novelty and test severity are necessary in order for 
hypotheses to meaningfully predict and be falsified by evidence.  Critically, if both use novelty and test 
severity are achieved, then even post hoc hypotheses can meaningfully predict and be falsified by 
previously-observed evidence. 
In the following sections, I leverage the concepts of use novelty and test severity in order to identify 
when three different types of HARKing are most and least likely to be detrimental to scientific progress.  I 
begin by considering two types of HARKing in which researchers add new hypotheses to their research 
report.  The first type occurs when researchers construct new hypotheses on the basis of their results and 
then report those hypotheses as if they are a priori hypotheses.  Kerr (1998) described this type of HARKing 
as “pure HARKing.”  In the present article, I use the phrase constructing hypotheses after the results are 
known, or CHARKing, in order to emphasise that researchers are constructing new hypotheses. 
The second type of HARKing occurs when researchers undertake a post hoc literature search in 
order to retrieve previously-published hypotheses that are then presented as a priori hypotheses in their 
research reports.  Kerr (1998) described this type of HARKing as “empirically-inspired scholarship.”  In 
the present article, I use the phrase retrieving hypotheses after the results are known, or RHARKing, in 
order to emphasise that researchers are retrieving hypotheses from a post hoc literature search. 
I then move on to consider a third type of HARKing in which researchers remove disconfirmed a 
priori hypotheses from their research reports.  Kerr (1998) describes this type of HARKing as “suppressing 
loser hypotheses.”  In the present article, I use the phrase suppressing hypotheses after the results are 
known, or SHARKing. 
 
CHARKing 
CHARKing entails the construction of hypotheses that are specifically designed to account for, or 
accommodate, the observed results.  Hence, CHARKing involves hypothesising on the basis of the known 
results and, consequently, the results are not use novel with respect to the hypotheses that are developed. 
CHARKing suffers from two key problems.  First, it precludes prediction and falsification because 
it produces hypotheses that are always confirmed by the results (Collins, 1994; Hitchcock & Sober, 2004; 
Kerr, 1998).  Second, it can produce complex hypotheses that contain many caveats and qualifications in 
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order to account for complex and irregular patterns of results (e.g., prejudice only increases self-esteem 
among black women who are aged 50 years or more).  Hitchcock and Sober (2004) described this process 
as overfitting because the resulting hypotheses accommodate not only general effects that exist in the 
population, but also nonreplicable idiosyncratic effects that are limited to the specific sample (see also 
Bosco et al., 2016; Gigerenzer, 2004; Schwab & Starbuck, 2017).  Overfitting is problematic because it 
increases the probability that hypotheses will be falsified in future samples. 
Despite these problems, several philosophers of science have argued that accommodation 
(CHARKing) can be as valid and useful as prediction when certain conducive conditions are met (e.g., 
Collins, 1994; Howson, 1988, Harker, 2006; Hitchcock & Sober, 2004; Lange, 2008; Mayo, 1996, 2008, 
2010, 2014; Schlesinger, 1987).  Below, I consider some of these conducive conditions, drawing in 
particular on Mayo’s work. 
Hypothesis that are based on accommodation (i.e., ad hoc hypotheses) are always confirmed by the 
observed evidence.  However, this does not mean that they will always be false.  Indeed, some ad hoc 
hypotheses may be true (Mayo, 2008).  According to Mayo (1996, 2008, 2014), two factors can increase 
the probability that ad hoc hypotheses will be true: (a) severe tests and (b) stringent hypothesis construction 
rules. 
Researchers who use severe tests (e.g., tests based on reliable and valid research designs and 
methods) are more likely to identify genuine effects than spurious error-based effects.  Furthermore, 
hypotheses that are constructed in order to accommodate genuine effects are more likely to be true than 
hypotheses that are based on spurious effects.  Consequently, although ad hoc hypotheses will always be 
confirmed by the evidence on which they are based, they will have a higher probability of being true when 
they accommodate results that are based on severe tests rather than nonsevere tests (Mayo, 1996, 2008, 
2014). 
To illustrate, imagine that a coin is biased such that it has a greater chance of landing on heads 
when tossed.  Further imagine that two researchers are informed that the coin is biased but they are not 
informed about the direction of the bias.  The researchers are then asked to conduct tests on the coin and 
generate ad hoc hypotheses about the direction of the bias.  Researcher A conducts a nonsevere test in which 
he only tosses the coin three times.  He observes that the coin lands on heads once and on tails twice.  Based 
on this evidence, he constructs the (incorrect) ad hoc hypothesis that the coin is biased towards tails.  
Researcher B conducts a more severe test in which she tosses the coin 100 times.  She observes that the 
coin lands on heads 66 times and on tails 34 times.  Based on this more reliable evidence, she constructs 
the (correct) ad hoc hypothesis that the coin is biased towards heads.  Note that both researchers’ ad hoc 
hypotheses are supported by the evidence that they observed.  However, Researcher B's more severe test 
provides more reliable data, and it is for this reason that her ad hoc hypothesis is more likely to be correct. 
Severe tests ensure that ad hoc hypotheses are based on high quality evidence.  However, high 
quality evidence is not sufficient to produce high quality hypotheses.  Stringent hypothesis construction 
rules are also required (Mayo, 2008, 2010, 2014).  In particular, ad hoc hypotheses should be (a) 
parsimonious and (b) consistent with prior theory and evidence (Hitchcock & Sober, 2004; Hollenbeck & 
Wright, 2017; Kerr, 1998; Murayama, Pekrun, & Fiedler, 2014; Stroebe, 2016).  I consider each of these 
stringent hypothesis construction rules in turn. 
First, ad hoc hypotheses should be parsimonious.  For example, the hypothesis that “prejudice 
reduces self-esteem” is more parsimonious than the convoluted hypothesis that “prejudice reduces self-
esteem, but not among men, unless they are white men in which case prejudice increases self-esteem, unless 
they are young white men, in which case prejudice has no effect on self-esteem.”  Parsimony helps to 
prevent ad hoc hypotheses from overfitting the observed results. 
Second, ad hoc hypotheses should also have a certain degree of consistency with prior theory and 
evidence.  All other things being equal, ad hoc hypotheses that have greater consistency with prior theory 
and evidence are less likely to overfit the results.  From a Bayesian perspective, such hypotheses also have 
a higher prior probability of being true (Dienes, 2016; Kerr, 1998; Murayama et al., 2014).2  To illustrate, 
consider a researcher who finds that prejudice increases self-esteem but only in relation to a state-based 
measure of body image (e.g., “At the moment, I feel good about my weight”) and not in relation to a trait-
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based measure of global self-esteem (e.g., “In general, I feel good about myself overall”).  The researcher 
considers three potential ad hoc hypotheses to explain this unexpected effect: (a) prejudice only increases 
state self-esteem, (b) prejudice only increases body-image self-esteem, and (c) prejudice only increases 
state-based body-image self-esteem.  Upon surveying the literature, the researcher finds that some prior 
theory and evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that prejudice increases state self-esteem, but that no 
prior theory or evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that prejudice increases body-image self-esteem.  
Following stringent hypothesis construction rules, the researcher then advances the ad hoc hypothesis that 
prejudice only increases state self-esteem as an explanation for their results.  In doing so, they avoid the 
less plausible hypothesis that prejudice only increases body-image self-esteem.  In addition, they avoid 
overfitting their results by proposing that prejudice only increases state-based body-image self-esteem. 
The stringent hypothesis construction rules of parsimony and consistency with prior theory and 
evidence increase the prior probability that the resulting ad hoc hypotheses will be true (Dienes, 2016; Kerr, 
1998; Murayama et al., 2014).  These rules also constrain the structure and content of ad hoc hypotheses 
and so limits the potential of the hypotheses to overfit the observed results.  In this sense, stringent 
hypothesis construction rules can be said to limit researchers’ degrees of freedom (Simmons et al., 2011) 
during the construction of ad hoc hypotheses so that there is less potential for the hypotheses to be biased 
towards the evidence.  Of course, researchers may ignore the rules of parsimony and consistency and instead 
construct convoluted and/or entirely unprecedented ad hoc hypotheses in order to accommodate results that 
would be otherwise inexplicable.  However, this unconstrained approach to ad hoc hypothesis construction 
is more likely to lead to overfitting and inferential error and, consequently, it is more likely to harm 
scientific progress. 
To summarize, researchers can engage in low quality accommodation based on nonsevere tests and 
unconstrained hypothesis construction or they can engage in high quality accommodation based on severe 
tests and stringent hypothesis construction rules.  This distinction between low and high quality 
accommodation is important when considering the potential harm that CHARKing may do to scientific 
progress and its potential role in the replication crisis.  HARKing is thought to contribute to a lack of 
replicable results as part of a multistage process (e.g., Munafò et al., 2017, Figure 1).  In this process, low 
statistical power, p-hacking, and uncorrected multiple testing provide nonsevere tests.  These nonsevere 
tests produce spurious results that feed into a process of unconstrained accommodation.  And this 
undisclosed accommodation then produces ostensibly confirmed a priori hypotheses that are actually false 
ad hoc hypotheses.  However, this process is only tenable in the case of low quality accommodation.  In the 
case of high quality accommodation, tests are more severe (i.e., high power, no p-hacking, no uncorrected 
multiple testing), the observed effects are more likely to be genuine, and the ad hoc hypotheses that 
accommodate those effects are more likely to be true.  In addition, hypothesis construction is constrained 
by stringent construction rules, making hypotheses more likely to be true and less likely to overfit spurious 
effects.  Hence, although low quality accommodation may result in false hypotheses that predict 
nonreplicable effects, high quality accommodation is more likely to result in true hypotheses that predict 
replicable effects.  In other words, not all accommodation (CHARKing) harms scientific progress, and only 
low quality accommodation is likely to be implicated in the replication crisis. 
Critics might argue that it is difficult to distinguish low quality accommodation from high quality 
accommodation in research reports.  However, the signs are quite obvious.  Low quality accommodation 
suffers from exactly the same problems as low quality research in general: poor quality methodology (e.g., 
low statistical power and unreliable, invalid, and/or insensitive measures, manipulations, and designs) and 
poor quality hypothesizing (unparsimonious hypotheses that are inconsistent with prior theory and 
evidence).  Peer reviewers and end-users are able to identify these problems and reduce their confidence in 
the reported research regardless of whether or not they suspect that researchers have engaged in HARKing. 
In summary, CHARKed hypotheses cannot be used to predict or falsify the results on which they 
are based.  Nonetheless, CHARKed hypotheses that are derived through a process of high quality 
accommodation are more likely to be true than those that are derived through a process of low quality 
accommodation.  And, if the ultimate aim of science is to uncover the truth, then high quality 
accommodation may be regarded as being more helpful to scientific progress than low quality 
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accommodation.  It is important to note that this conclusion does not dispute the fact that it is deceptive for 
researchers to misrepresent accommodation as prediction.  Hence, CHARKing should never be concealed; 
researchers should always indicate in their research reports any hypotheses that are ad hoc and any analyses 
that are exploratory. 
 
RHARKing 
CHARKing is not the only way in which researchers can engage in post hoc hypothesising.  
RHARKING involves retrieving hypotheses after the results are known.  RHARKing occurs when 
empirical disconfirmation of a priori hypotheses inspires researchers to engage in a post hoc search for 
other relevant hypotheses in the literature – a process that Kerr (1998) described as “empirically-inspired 
scholarship.”  Researchers then present their retrieved hypotheses as a priori hypotheses in their research 
reports.  For example, if our prejudice researcher found that prejudice reduced self-esteem rather than 
increased it, then she might proceed to search the literature and find Researcher B’s (1989) Hypothesis B 
that the prejudice reduces self-esteem.  She might then present Hypothesis B as a confirmed a priori 
hypothesis in her research report despite its post hoc inspiration. 
RHARKing is markedly different from CHARKing for three reasons.  First, unlike hypotheses 
based on CHARKing, hypotheses based on RHARKing are constructed independent from researchers’ 
known results.  Specifically, the fact that such hypotheses are proposed in research articles that were 
published prior to researchers’ analysis of their data guarantees the use novelty of that evidence.  
Importantly, this use novelty is not undermined by the facts that (a) researchers come to know about the 
hypotheses after they know about their results or (b) those results include the disconfirmation of one or 
more of the researchers’ a priori hypotheses.  Hence, unlike CHARKing, RHARKing does not involve 
hypothesizing on the basis of the known results, and the resulting hypotheses have the potential to both 
predict and be falsified by evidence that is already known by the researcher.  To illustrate, consider the 
Texas sharpshooter analogy again.  Imagine that the sharpshooter misses the original target but then dusts 
off the barn wall around his bullet hole to reveal that it landed inside a second target that was drawn on the 
wall several years ago by someone else.  This “dusting off” represents RHARKing, and the second target 
that the sharpshooter uncovers represents a previously-constructed hypothesis.  Note that the hypothesis 
and evidence remain independent in this case because the researcher did not draw the target around his own 
bullet hole.  Furthermore, the second target was able to predict where the sharpshooter’s shot would land. 
Second, compared to CHARKing, RHARKing leaves a different scholarly footprint in research 
reports, and that footprint enables an objective verification of use novelty.  In the case of undisclosed 
CHARKing, readers have no way of objectively verifying whether or not hypotheses were constructed 
independent from the observed evidence.  In contrast, in the case of undisclosed RHARKing, readers are 
able to confirm the independence of hypotheses by checking the cited articles from which those hypotheses 
are claimed to have been retrieved.  For example, our prejudice researcher might state: “in the current study, 
I tested Researcher B’s (1989) Hypothesis B that prejudice reduces self-esteem.”  In this case, readers are 
able to confirm the use novelty of Hypotheses B by consulting Researcher B’s (1989) article.  Note that the 
researcher could also disclose that she read about Hypothesis B after observing her results (Schwab & 
Starbuck, 2017, p. 131).  However, it is unclear how this additional information would be helpful because 
the time at which the researcher became aware of the hypothesis has no bearing on the extent to which the 
researcher’s evidence was used in the construction of that hypothesis. 
Finally, compared to CHARKing, RHARKing makes a more modest, incremental contribution to 
scientific progress.  Researchers who engage in CHARKing are able to construct new hypotheses.  In 
contrast, researchers who engage in RHARKing are limited to testing old hypotheses that have been 
previously advanced in the extant literature.  Hence, hypotheses that result from RHARKing will be less 
innovative than those that result from CHARKing.  Nonetheless, researchers who RHARK may still make 
an important contribution to science by testing the replicability and generalizability of old hypotheses.  In 
the absence of any qualifying information, most hypotheses contain an implicit assumption that the effects 
that they predict are replicable and generalizable to some extent (Simons, Shoda, & Lindsay, 2017).  Hence, 
researchers can test the replicability and generalizability of previously-hypothesized effects to previously-
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untested populations, measures, methods, contexts, and cultures.  For example, after engaging in 
RHARKing, our prejudice researcher might find that her evidence that prejudice reduced self-esteem is 
predicted by Researcher B’s (1989) Hypothesis B, but that Hypothesis B has only been tested using global 
measures of self-esteem.  Our researcher may then make a significant contribution by demonstrating that 
Hypothesis B is also confirmed using multidimensional measures of specific self-esteem that assess several 
different aspects of self-esteem.  Note that if researchers discover boundary conditions to pre-existing 
hypotheses (e.g., Hypothesis B is only confirmed on some dimensions of self-esteem and not on others), 
then those findings may either be predicted via further RHARKing or transparently accommodated via high 
quality CHARKing. 
In summary, RHARKing does not pose any threat to science.  Instead, it makes a modest 
contribution to scientific progress by testing the replicability and generalizability of old hypotheses.  Critics 
may raise two objections to this conclusion. 
First, it might be argued that the research literature contains an abundance of unfalsified hypotheses 
that may be retrieved via RHARKing (Ferguson & Heene, 2012), and that researchers often experience 
implicit pressures to select hypotheses that are confirmed by their results in order to increase their chances 
of publishing their work (e.g., Fanelli, 2010; Mazzola & Deuling, 2013; Motyl et al., 2017; Nosek et al., 
2017; O’Boyle et al., 2017).  Hence, RHARKing may preclude reported falsification because researchers 
are biased towards retrieving confirmed hypotheses rather than disconfirmed hypotheses.  However, 
although this selection bias may occur, it represents a separate type of HARKing called suppressing 
hypotheses after the results are known or SHARKing, and I address it in depth in the next section.  At this 
stage, it should suffice to point out that if researchers report both the confirmed and the disconfirmed 
hypotheses that they discover during their RHARKing, then that post hoc scholarship may operate in an 
unbiased manner and without any harm to scientific progress.  It should also be noted that erudite peer 
review teams are able to reduce this type of selection bias.  As Kerr (1998, p. 212) explained, “editors and 
reviewers who are sufficiently knowledgeable should be able to distinguish a biased and selective appeal 
to the literature from a balanced and comprehensive one.” 
A second argument against RHARKing is that researchers can find flexible theories or hypotheses 
that “predict nearly any pattern of results in nearly any context” (Kerr, 1998, p. 210; see also van't Veer and 
Giner-Sorolla, 2016, p. 4).  However, this argument is more applicable to theories than it is to hypotheses.  
Certainly, researchers may interpret pre-existing theories in many different ways in order to predict 
numerous patterns of results, and this unconstrained ad hoc hypothesis construction leads to the low quality 
accommodation that was addressed in relation to CHARKing.  However, researchers have less freedom to 
predict numerous patterns of results from pre-existing hypotheses because hypothesis are more specific than 
theories in the predictions that they make.  For example, returning to the prejudice study example, recall 
that Researcher B’s (1989) Hypothesis B predicts a single unidirectional effect: that prejudice reduces self-
esteem.  In the absence of any post hoc modification, Hypothesis B cannot be interpreted as predicting 
either an increase in self-esteem or no change in self-esteem.  A similar constraint is likely to apply to most 
hypotheses.  Hence, researchers who engage in RHARKing per se are unlikely to find hypotheses that are 
sufficiently flexible to predict multiple patterns of results.  However, even if they are able to identify such 
vague and flexible hypotheses, then they still need to convince their audience about the usefulness of these 
hypotheses, and, in most cases, this will not be an easy task because research is usually judged on the quality 
and strength of not only the evidence but also the hypotheses.  Hence, hypotheses that are sufficiently vague 
and flexible to predict numerous mutually exclusive patterns results will tend to be dismissed as suffering 
from “predictive impotence” (Hitchcock & Sober, 2004, p. 7).  Returning to the Texas sharpshooter 
example, if the sharpshooter fires multiple shots at the barn wall at random and with his eyes closed (i.e., 
in the absence of any genuine effects), then his bullet holes will be scattered all over the side of the barn, 
and the size of the target that he needs to find after dusting off the barn wall (RHARKing) will need to be 
the size of the barn wall if he wants to make it look as if he hit the target.  Such a target is likely to be 
entirely unimpressive to his onlookers!   
In summary, RHARKing involves the retrieval of old hypotheses that are independent from results 
that are already known by the researcher, and these hypotheses can therefore predict and be falsified by 
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those results.  RHARKing can make a modest contribution to scientific progress by testing the replicability 
and generalizability of previously-hypothesized effects.  Threats to this approach include researchers 
restricting their selection of hypotheses to those that confirm their results, including relatively flexible and 
undiagnostic hypotheses.  However, these potential selection biases do not compromise the use novelty of 
the observed evidence, and they can be identified and addressed during the peer review process. 
 
SHARKing 
The third type of HARKing involves researchers failing to report a priori hypotheses, most likely 
because those hypotheses are unsupported by their results (Kerr, 1998).  Suppressing hypotheses after the 
results are known, or SHARKing, can be harmful to science because it precludes the reported falsification 
of hypotheses.  When associated results are also suppressed, SHARKing can bias information about the 
size and replicability of effects in meta-analyses (Bosco et al., 2016; Schwab & Starbuck, 2017).  
Nonetheless, there are some conditions under which SHARKing may not impede scientific progress. 
Leung (2011) suggested that hypotheses and evidence can be suppressed without any harm to 
science when they are unrelated to the final research conclusions.  So, for example, if the theory and 
evidence for Hypothesis X is unrelated to the theory and evidence for Hypothesis Y, then failing to report 
Hypothesis X and its evidence will have no impact on the conclusions that are drawn regarding Hypothesis 
Y and its evidence.  However, if Hypotheses X and Y are related to one another, then it will be necessary 
to report the results of tests of both hypotheses, because failing to report the results for Hypothesis X may 
affect the perceived veracity of the research conclusions regarding Hypothesis Y. 
Leung’s (2011) proposal makes sense in relation to the scientific integrity of individual research 
articles.  However, it overlooks the impact of SHARKing on the broader scientific process.  Although a 
priori hypotheses and their associated results may be unrelated to the final conclusions of a research article, 
they may be nonetheless important to the conclusions of other research articles, including meta-analyses 
(Bosco et al., 2016; Ferguson & Heene, 2012; Kerr, 1998, p. 208).  From this broader perspective, the 
results of all a priori hypotheses should be reported regardless of whether or not they are related to a specific 
research report’s final conclusions. 
Having said this, concerns about the disclosure of all hypothesis tests need to be balanced with 
concerns about the quality of those tests.  After all, low quality tests and methodology are purported to be 
one of the reasons for the current replication crisis (e.g., John et al., 2012; Munafò et al., 2017; Świątkowski 
& Dompnier, 2017).  Hence, it is also necessary to take account of test severity when considering whether 
or not to report tests of hypotheses that are unrelated to an article’s final conclusions (Mayo, 1991, 1996; 
Parker, 2015).  Nonsevere tests are more likely to lead researchers to incorrectly accept or reject hypotheses 
and, consequently, these tests and hypotheses may be omitted from the broader scientific record without 
adversely affecting scientific progress.  In contrast, severe tests provide valuable information about 
hypotheses regardless of the relation between those hypotheses and the final conclusions of a specific 
research article.  Consequently, such tests and hypotheses should be retained in the scientific record. 
Putting the arguments about relatedness (Leung, 2011) and test severity (Mayo, 1991, 1996) 
together, it can be concluded that a priori hypotheses may be omitted from a research article without any 
harm to science when they are (a) unrelated to the final conclusions of that article and (b) the subject of 
nonsevere tests.  In contrast, if a priori hypotheses are either related to the article’s final conclusions or the 
subject of severe tests, then they should be reported. 
Three objections might be raised against the above approach.  First, it might be argued that we need 
greater transparency in the research process, not less, and that there is no reason to exclude information 
about any a priori hypotheses or any research results.  If tests are nonsevere, then information about severity 
should be provided, and readers should be empowered to form their own opinions about the value of the 
evidence.  However, this argument ignores a key limitation regarding the communication of science:  
Consumers of research have limited time and ability to comprehend long and/or complex sets of results.  
Consequently, it is necessary for researchers to balance concerns about providing comprehensive 
information with concerns about clarity and concision (Kerr, 1998; Leung, 2011; Vazire, 2014).  As Kerr 
(1998) pointed out, “research reports neither can nor should be detailed laboratory diaries.  Research report 
When Does HARKing Hurt?           14 
writing must necessarily be selective” (p. 203).  Given this practical constraint, it seems sensible to omit 
information from research reports that has the least value, and nonsevere tests of hypotheses that are 
unrelated to the final research conclusions fit this criterion. 
Second, it might be argued that excluding hypotheses from research reports reduces the apparent 
number of null hypothesis significance tests that have been undertaken and therefore lowers readers’ 
expectations about encountering Type I errors as a result of multiple testing (Szucs, 2016).  For example, 
if a researcher tests 20 hypotheses with an alpha level of .05, then he has a 64.15% chance of making at 
least one Type I error.  However, if his results confirm only one of these hypotheses, and he decides to 
suppress the other 19 disconfirmed hypotheses, then he will give the incorrect impression that he only 
conducted a single hypothesis test and that, consequently, he only had a 5.00% chance of making a Type I 
error.  Hence, SHARKing may artificially inflate readers’ confidence in the probity of the reported results.  
However, this error rate problem is only valid for cases in which hypotheses are related to the final research 
conclusions.  If hypotheses are unrelated to the final research conclusions (which is the approach being 
advocated here), then they do not constitute part of the same family of hypotheses that are contingent on 
the same universal null hypothesis.  Consequently, they should not be counted in the calculation for 
familywise error control (for related discussions, see Matsunaga, 2007; Rubin, 2017).  Hence, in the 
example above, if the 19 suppressed hypotheses are unrelated to the final research conclusions, then tests 
of those hypotheses will not inflate the Type I error rate for the single hypothesis that is reported, and 
SHARKing will not bias readers’ expectations regarding Type I errors. 
Finally, researchers’ judgements about whether hypotheses are “related” or “unrelated” to research 
conclusions and whether tests are “severe” or “nonsevere” are relatively arbitrary and subjective.  
Consequently, researchers should always attempt to err on the side of caution when making judgements 
about these matters and, if necessary, seek independent advice from their peer review team. 
In summary, it is not appropriate to suppress a priori hypotheses or their associated evidence when 
either (a) the hypotheses are related to a research article’s final conclusions or (b) the tests of those 
hypotheses are severe.  However, it is appropriate to suppress nonsevere tests of a priori hypotheses that 
are unrelated to an article’s final conclusions.  Suppressing such hypotheses does not artificially increase 
readers’ confidence in the results, and it helps rather than harms science by allowing clearer and more 
concise communications of results.  In cases in which it is unclear whether or not hypotheses are related to 
final conclusions and/or tests are severe, independent judgements should be sought from editors and peer 
reviewers. 
 
When is HARKing Unethical? 
So far, I have identified the conditions under which three different types of HARKing are likely to 
be more or less harmful to scientific progress.  However, progressing science is not the only determinant of 
research practice.  Scientists are also obligated to undertake research in an ethically responsible manner.  
Hence, it is also important to consider the extent to which different types of HARKing are more or less 
ethical. 
Kerr (1998, p. 197) was against moralizing about the ethics of HARKing because “too many 
complex arguments exist on each side to make ‘the evils of HARKing’ the theme of a compelling sermon.”  
Despite this view, there is a growing trend to regard undisclosed HARKing as unethical (e.g., Świątkowski 
& Dompnier, 2017) because it contradicts the general principles of openness and transparency in the 
research process.  Again, however, I think that it is useful to adopt an articulated and contextual approach 
to this issue that considers when different types of undisclosed HARKing may be unethical and when they 
may be ethical (for a related discussion, see Leung, 2011). 
Failing to disclose CHARKing (accommodation) may be considered to be unethical because it 
conceals two important pieces of information.  First, it conceals the fact that the reported hypotheses are 
unable to predict or be falsified by the evidence.  Second, it conceals the fact that overfitting is possible 
during the hypothesis construction process. 
In contrast, failing to disclose RHARKing may be considered to be ethical because disclosing that 
one read about a pre-existing hypothesis before or after analyzing one’s data does not provide any useful 
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information to readers.  In particular, reading about a pre-existing hypothesis after checking one’s results 
does not alter the use novelty of those results for that hypothesis.  Furthermore, statements such as “in the 
present research, I tested Researcher B’s (1989) Hypothesis B that prejudice reduces self-esteem” are true 
regardless of whether researchers read about Hypothesis B before or after knowing their results.  Similarly, 
follow-up statements such as “as predicted, prejudice caused a reduction in participants’ self-esteem” are 
also accurate when they refer back to a RHARKed hypothesis (e.g., Researcher B’s, 1989, Hypothesis B). 
SHARKing may be either ethical or unethical depending on whether the hypotheses are the subject 
of severe or nonsevere tests and whether they are related or unrelated to the final research conclusions.  The 
suppression of hypotheses that are either severely-tested or related to the final research conclusions may be 
considered to be unethical because it conceals important information from readers and the broader scientific 
record.  In contrast, the suppression of hypotheses that are both nonseverely-tested and unrelated to the 
final research conclusions may be considered to be ethical because it conceals unimportant information 
from readers. 
Finally, it is helpful to distinguish between active HARKing and passive HARKing when 
considering the ethics of HARKing.  Active HARKing is undertaken by researchers prior to the submission 
of their research report to the peer review team.  In contrast, passive HARKing is undertaken by researchers 
in response to requests by editors and peer reviewers to change hypotheses, add new hypotheses, and/or 
suppress loser hypotheses (Bedeian, Taylor, & Miller, 2010; Bosco et al., 2016; Giner-Sorolla, 2012; Kerr 
& Harris, 1998, as cited in Kerr, 1998; Kepes & McDaniel, 2013; Hollenbeck & Wright, 2017; Leung, 
2011; Motyl et al., 2017; O’Boyle et al., 2017; Schwab & Starbuck, 2017).  For example, passive HARKing 
may occur when researchers comply with the requests of editors and/or peer reviewers to suppress null 
findings and their associated hypotheses, test new hypotheses, and/or “reframe” or “refocus” the narrative 
of articles.  Again, the circumstances behind these requests need to be understood before judgements can 
be made about their potential harm to science and their ethical status.  However, all other things being equal, 
passive HARKing is likely to be more ethical than active HARKing because it is not used by researchers 
to try to conceal information that might otherwise influence the publication decision. 
In summary, not all types of HARKing are unethical under all conditions.  Instead, HARKing falls 
into a “gray zone” of ethical practice (Butler, Delaney, & Spoelstra, 2017; O’Boyle et al., 2017), with only 
some types of HARKing being ethically unacceptable under some conditions.  Consequently, judgements 
about the ethics of HARKing need be made on a case-by-case basis that takes into account the context of 
specific research situations. 
 
Conclusions 
HARKing has become a hot topic in the wake of the replication crisis.  However, the discussion 
seems to have polarized towards the view that all HARKing is bad for science.  In the present article, I 
provided a more nuanced view by identifying when different types of HARKing are most likely and least 
likely to be harmful to science.  I arrived at the following conclusions. 
CHARKing (accommodation) occurs when researchers construct hypotheses after the results are 
known.  CHARKed hypotheses lack independence from the observed evidence and, consequently, these 
hypotheses cannot be used to predict or be falsified by the evidence.  Accordingly, CHARKing should 
always be disclosed in research reports.  CHARKing is less harmful to scientific progress (a) when it 
accommodates results that have been obtained using severe tests (e.g., tests that are based on reliable and 
valid research designs and methodology) and (b) when it is based on stringent hypothesis construction rules 
(that produce ad hoc hypotheses that have satisfactory parsimony and consistency with prior theory and 
evidence). 
RHARKing occurs when researchers retrieve hypotheses from the extant literature after the results 
are known.  RHARKed hypotheses have been constructed independent from known results, and so they can 
predict and be falsified by the known results.  RHARKing allows researchers to make a modest contribution 
to scientific progress by testing the replicability and generalizability of previously-hypothesized effects in 
relation to new populations, measures, methods, contexts, and cultures.  To enable independent verification 
of RHARKing, researchers should provide citations to the articles that propound the hypotheses being 
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tested.  To prevent a selection bias, researchers should report hypotheses in the literature that are both 
confirmed and disconfirmed by their evidence. 
Finally, SHARKing involves the suppression of a priori hypotheses after the results are known.  
The suppression of hypotheses that are related to a research article’s final conclusions can artificially inflate 
the perceived veracity of those conclusions.  In addition, the suppression of a priori hypotheses that have 
undergone severe testing represents the omission of important information.  However, the suppression of a 
priori hypotheses that are (a) unrelated to an article’s final conclusions and (b) that have undergone 
nonsevere tests represent the omission of unimportant information.  Consequently, this type of SHARKing 
may be undertaken without detriment to either specific or broad scientific progress.  It may also help in the 
communication of science by increasing the clarity and concision of research reports. 
The replication crisis may be related to (a) CHARKing based on nonsevere tests and nonstringent 
hypothesis construction rules and (b) SHARKing of severe tests of a priori hypotheses and nonsevere tests 
that are related to final research conclusions.  However, the replication crisis is less likely to be related to 
(a) CHARKing based on severe tests and stringent hypothesis construction rules, (b) RHARKing, and/or 
(c) SHARKing of nonsevere tests of a priori hypotheses that are unrelated to the final research conclusions. 
It is difficult to arrive at generic ethical principles about HARKing given the diversity of the 
research practices and conditions that are involved.  However, the concealment of (a) CHARKing and (b) 
hypothesis that are either severely-tested or related to the final research conclusions represent the 
concealment of important information and, consequently, these practices can usually be considered to be 
unethical. 
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Endnotes 
1. Mayo (1991, 1996) proposed that her concept of severity encompasses and supersedes Worrall’s (1985) 
concept of use novelty.  Specifically, she argued that although use novelty can contribute to severe 
tests, it is neither necessary nor sufficient for severity (Mayo, 2014).  Instead, Mayo (2008) argued that 
severity depends on the way in which both evidence and hypotheses are generated (i.e., test severity 
and stringent use-construction rules; Mayo, 2008, 2010, 2014).  In response, Worrall (2010) argued that 
it is helpful to distinguish use novelty from test severity because using evidence to construct a 
hypothesis is different from using evidence to test a hypothesis.  In the present article, I adopt Worrall’s 
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approach and distinguish between use novelty and test severity because this distinction provides greater 
clarity when discussing HARKing.  Nonetheless, I refer to Mayo’s (2008, 2010, 2014) arguments 
regarding stringent hypothesis construction. 
2. Although Kerr (1998) did not advocate CHARKing, he did suggest a Bayesian approach towards 
improving the usefulness of accommodation.  Specifically, he proposed that after researchers had 
constructed a new hypothesis based on their results, they could “counterfactually estimate the prior 
probability of that hypothesis being true given knowledge of all evidence available except for those 
new results, and then use Bayes's theorem to estimate how much belief now to place in the new 
hypothesis in light of the new results (i.e., the posterior probability)” (p. 206).  Kerr doubted that this 
approach would work in practice because researchers’ knowledge of their results would be likely to 
bias their selection of other relevant evidence for estimating the prior probability of the hypothesis.  
However, he may have dismissed this approach too quickly, because it is possible to remove this bias 
by asking independent experts to estimate the prior probability of the hypothesis. 
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